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Abstract
In this paper, we present a new approach for safe exe-
cution of untrusted programs by isolating their effects from
the rest of the system. Isolation is achieved by intercepting
le operations made by untrusted processes, and redirect-
ing any change operations to a modication cache that
is invisible to other processes in the system. File read op-
erations performed by the untrusted process are also cor-
respondingly modied, so that the process has a consistent
view of system state that incorporatesthe contentsof the le
system as well as the modication cache. On termination of
the untrusted process, its user is presented with a concise
summary of the les modied by the process. Additionally,
the user can inspect these les using various software util-
ities (e.g., helper applications to view multimedia les) to
determine if the modicationsare acceptable.The user then
has the option to commit these modications, or simply dis-
card them. Essentially, our approach provides play and
rewind buttons for running untrusted software. Key ben-
ets of our approach are that it requires no changes to the
untrusted programs (to be isolated) or the underlying oper-
atingsystem; itcannotbesubvertedbymaliciousprograms;
and it achieves these benets with acceptable runtime over-
heads. We describe a prototype implementation of this sys-
tem for Linux called Alcatraz and discuss its performance
and effectiveness.
1. Introduction
The widespread deployment of rewalls and related so-
lutions for network security has signicantly raised the bar
for remote attacks on an enterprise network. However, even
the best perimeter solutions can be easily defeated by an at-
tacker that can induce users inside the enterprise to down-
load and execute malicious code. While virus detection and
similar techniques can be deployed to detect widely preva-
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lentinstancesofmaliciouscode,suchtechniquesarelimited
in theory (by the fact that detection of malicious code is un-
decidable in general) as well as practice (by factors such as
the difculty of object code analysis and encryption).
A more promising approach for defending against mali-
ciouscodeis basedonsandboxing,whereinthe resourceac-
cesses made by untrusted code are suitably restricted to en-
sure security. However, use of such approaches in practice
has been hampered by the difculty of policy selection: de-
termining resource access rights that would allow the code
to executesuccessfully without compromisingsystem secu-
rity. Too often, sandboxing tools incorporate highly restric-
tive policies that preclude execution of most useful applica-
tions. The net result is that users end up choosing function-
ality over security, and thus execute untrusted code outside
such sandboxing tools, exposing themselves to unbounded
damage if this code turned out to be malicious.
An alternative to sandboxing is isolated execu-
tion, wherein the actions of untrusted code are isolated
from other applications. Isolated execution has previ-
ously been studied by researchers [15, 7] in the context
of Java applets. Such applets do not require much ac-
cess to system resources, other than being able to inter-
act with a user. Hence the implementationapproachusedby
these works relied on executing untrusted applets on a re-
mote playground, i.e., an isolated computer (other
than a user's desktop). However, applications that per-
form more useful functions will require access to resources
such as the le system on the user's computer. To pro-
vide such access, the entire environment on the user's
computer, including le system contents, must be dupli-
cated on the remote playground.
Logical isolation, wherein the effects of a malicious pro-
cess are logically isolated from otherprocesses, can achieve
the benets of isolated execution without the drawback of
requiring dedicated hardware or solving the difcult prob-
lemofaccurateduplicationofenvironment.It was proposed
in [19] to permit continued operation of compromised pro-
cesses without alerting attackers and without risking dam-
age to the rest of the system, and in [11] in the context ofdatabases. The theory of data isolation was further devel-
oped systematically in [14] in the context of databases as
well as le systems, and isolation protocols that demon-
strate the feasibility of the approach were presented. How-
ever, practical issues that arise in implementing this ap-
proach on contemporary operating systems were not stud-
ied. In contrast, this paper develops an application- and
OS-transparentapproachfor isolated executionof untrusted
programs, and describes a tool called Alcatraz that imple-
ments this approach on the Linux operating system.
Our approach permits untrusted applications to access
the entire le system that is accessible to the end users,
thereby making it possible for most applications to carry
out their tasks. Using a copy-on-write semantics, modica-
tions to the le system that are performed by the untrusted
application are hidden from the rest of the system, which
ensures that malicious actions of the untrustedcode will not
compromise the integrity of the system. Accesses to non-
le resources are restricted as needed to ensure integrity. At
the completion of execution, the users can inspect the ac-
cesses made by the untrusted code to see if it changed any
les of interest to them, and if so, examine these changes. If
the users are convinced that these changes are benign, then
they can commit these changes, so that they become visi-
ble to the rest of the system. Otherwise, the users can abort
these changes. The key benets of our approach are:
 Applicationandoperatingsystem transparency.Ourap-
proach requires no changes to the underlying operating
system or the untrusted application itself. Moreover,the
technique can be applied regardless of whether the les
accessed by the application are local, or are located on
a remote le server.
 Secure yet application-friendly. Our approach provides
security against malicious code without imposing un-
due restrictions on such code. This makes it possible
for a large class of existing software to execute success-
fully, unlike sandboxing based approaches.
 Convenient and user-friendly. Our approach provides a
compact summary of the le system resource accesses
made by untrusted code at the end of its execution. This
contrasts with sandboxingapproachesthat prompt users
on each le access disallowed by the sandbox policy. In
addition, the user is given the ability to examine these
les todeterminewhethertheapplicationcarriedoutthe
functionality that the user wanted.
Ourimplementationdoesnotrequiretheusersofoursystem
to possess administrator privileges. It imposes modest over-
heads for isolation (below 20% for all the applications we
have studied). However, the mechanism we have used for
systemcallinterpositionposesmoderateoverheads,ranging
from under 10% for CPU-intensive applications to nearly
100% for I/O-intensive applications.
The description in the rest of the paper is set in the con-
text of Linux, but the techniques are applicable to most
modern operating systems. The organization of the rest of
paperis as follows. We begin with two motivatingexamples
in Section 1.1. Section 2 provides an overview of the sys-
tem design, followed by more detailed descriptions of the
system components. Implementation results are discussed
in Section 3, followed by related work in Section 4. Finally,
concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
1.1. Motivating Examples
Photo organizer. Consider an application that scans spec-
ied directories for image les and generates photo album
les that are written to the same directories. It also gener-
ates thumbnail pictures from these les (for creating index
les) and has the ability to modify/resize these les. Simi-
lar applicationsthat modify images and other media such as
audio les are available as freeware on the Internet, e.g., the
picturepages [21] package. Safe execution of such ap-
plications poses two challenges for sandboxingapproaches.
 policy selection: Users have to anticipate the resource
access requirements of a program prior to its execu-
tion, which is often difcult. To overcome this problem,
some sandboxing approaches allow changes to policies
through runtime prompts to the user: when the sand-
boxed application violates the initially specied pol-
icy, the user is informed and queried whether he/she
wants to permit this access. Unfortunately, such re-
peated prompts lead to click-fatigue, as a result of
which the user simply grants (or refuses) all subsequent
prompts without reviewing them.
 policy granularity: Users need to develop policies that
permit an application to access the resources that it
needs, while ensuring that these resources are not cor-
ruptedordeleted.Forthephotoorganizerexample,such
a policy would have to permit legitimate changes to
image les, as needed for resizing images or including
previews, while disallowing other changes. Develop-
ment of a policy that can capture such legitimate trans-
formationsis likely to be hard.Even if such policies can
be expressed, enforcement of such policies is likely to
be inefcient, if not impossible [18].
Duetothesedifculties,sandboxingpoliciestendtobecon-
servativeand oftendisallowa largeclass of usefulprograms
such as the picturepages program. In contrast, our pro-
posed approach will permit execution of programs as long
as they don't make system changes other than le modica-
tion operations. Most applications observe this constraint,
and hence they can be run safely using isolation. Moreover,
users need not develop safety policies ahead of time. Fi-
nally, they have the opportunityto examine the system state
resulting due to the executionof the untrusted program,and
then decide whether to keep or rollback these changes.
They can use standard system utilities such as find anddiff, as well as arbitrary helper applications such as im-
age viewers, to examine the system state.
Software installation. Users are all too familiar with
poorly packaged software that crashes during its installa-
tion, or simply does not function correctly. Even worse,
the new package may break other applications in-
stalled on the system. In all these cases, the users are
faced with the daunting task of rolling back the instal-
lation. If the package made use of standard package
management utilities, this rollback is usually not burden-
some. However, if the package came as a self-installing
executable or as a source package, rollbacks are al-
most always very difcult. The package may install its
les into standard directories such as /usr/local/bin
and /lib. It may also modify system conguration les
such as /etc/passwd, /etc/mime.types or user pro-
le les such as /.bashrc. Identifying the exact set
of les that were modied is cumbersome. It is also
prone to errors as the user does not know the directo-
ries where the package installed les, and hence has to
search the entire le system. This may result in identify-
ing many les that may have been modied by applications
other than the installer. Even if the modied les are identi-
ed correctly, rollback is still a hard problem: it is possible
only if the user had backed up modied les, but unfor-
tunately, the user did not know ahead of time which les
would be modied by the installation.
Using our isolation approach, all of the above problems
can be tackled easily. Users simply install the package in
isolation. Within this isolation environment, users can then
try out the package. They can also examine the les mod-
ied by the package, and see if it includes security-critical
les, or les that may be used by other packages. (System
conguration databases, such as the Redhat Package Man-
ager database, can help in identifying les used by other
packages.) If so, they can examine these les to identify the
changes made. Alternatively, they can try out the applica-
tions that depend on these modied les to ensure that they
are not broken. If the users are convinced, after making all
these checks, that the new package has been installed cor-
rectly and is functioning properly, they can commit the in-
stallation.Otherwisetheycancan discardtheinstallation
at this point, the le system state will be as if the installa-
tion never took place.
2. System Description
2.1. Technical Goals and Design Approaches
The goal of logical isolation is to preserve system in-
tegrity.1 In particular, if the le system changes made by an
1 Condentiality can be preserved to the extent the untrusted applica-
tion can be prevented from making network communications, but this
untrustedapplicationwere notcommitted,thenthe integrity
of the system must not be compromised by this application.
Moreover, there should be no data loss, such as the loss as-
sociated with rolling back the effects of other system and
user processes. In effect, the system state should be as if the
untrusted application was never run.
Our approach is focused on preserving the contents of
the le system. However, in order to ensure overall sys-
tem integrity,we also needto consideroperationsotherthan
those involving le systems. Such operations must be pre-
vented from being executed if they can change the system
state. We need to be conservative in determining whether
an operation can change system state: unless we know for
sure, an operation made by an untrusted process must be
disallowed. A simple implementation of such a conserva-
tiveapproachmaydisallow all networkcommunications(as
they can modifythe state of other hosts), le operationsthat
modify devices, etc. A more usable approach will recog-
nize a subset of these operations that do not change sys-
tem state, and permit them. For instance, it is reasonable
to consider that DNS queries do not modify system state.
Similarly, sufcient intelligence may be built into the im-
plementation to recognize and permit certain device-level
operations that query system state without modifying it.
More generally, service-specic proxies may be built that
can forward those service requests that do not change sys-
tem state, while disallowing other requests. Such service-
specic proxies may be built to access X-windows, web
servers, audio devices, etc. For the rest of this paper, we
do not discuss such service-specic proxies, but focus on
achieving le system level isolation.
Inourapproach,le-levelisolationis achievedusingiso-
lation contexts. An isolation context can be thought of as a
private copy of the entire le system. It is implemented
using a copy-on-write technique, so that its storage require-
ment is proportional to the changes made within the isola-
tion context, and not on the size of the entire le system. A
new isolation context is created when an untrusted process
is about to be executed. If this process creates child pro-
cesses, then all such children and their descendants are ex-
ecuted within the same isolation context. This ensures that
the untrusted process and its descendants have an identical
(and consistent) view of the le system state. Multiple un-
trusted applications may be executed independently, each
within its own isolation context2.
To implement isolation contexts, le system changes
made by an untrusted process are redirected so that they
do not change global system state. Such redirection may be
built into the applicationitself or within the system libraries
is not our main goal in this paper.
2 Copy-on-write provides one-way-isolation, i.e., changes made within
an isolation context are shielded from the rest of the system, but the
changes made outside of isolation contexts may be visible inside.System Call Interceptor Manager
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thatareusedtoaccess les. Neitherapproachis satisfactory,
since they require the applications to be trusted. In particu-
lar,a maliciousapplicationcan bypasssuch redirection,and
make direct access to the system calls provided by the OS
for manipulatingles. We therefore rely on OS-level mech-
anisms that can support secure redirection. There are two
main choices in this regard:
 System-call interposition: Since all accesses to system
resources (including accesses to les, devices and the
network) are effected through system calls, interposing
at this level provides a secure way to achieve isolation.
 Interposition at the VFS layer: The Virtual File System
layer provides an abstract interface within the OS ker-
nel for accessing all le systems. One benet of inter-
posing at this layer is that of higher performance: only
le system operations are interposed, as opposed to all
system calls.
Of these choices, we have adopted system call interposition
fortwo reasons.First, it canbeimplementedwithoutrequir-
ing changes to the operating system. Indeed, the ptrace
mechanismin Linuxpermits ordinaryusers to interceptsys-
tem calls made by their processes, without requiring them
tomakeanyOS-levelchangesthatneedsuperuserprivilege.
Second, as discussed earlier, we need to monitor non-le
operations made by the untrusted process, and hence sys-
tem call interposition would be necessary even if le level
isolation were implemented using VFS interposition.
2.2. System Overview
The architectureof our system, called Alcatraz, is shown
in Figure 1. The isolation engine consists of several com-
ponents. The manager module coordinates the operations
of the isolation engine. It uses the modication cache as a
scratch-pad area where new les (or directories) created by
the untrusted process are held. The modication cache is
a dedicated area within the le system, and uses a distinc-
tive name so that multiple Alcatraz sessions can run on the
same system.For les (anddirectories)storedin the modi-
cation cache, the mapping table provides the translation be-
tween le names used by an untrustedprocess and theircor-
responding names within the modication cache. The table
also records other information pertaining to modied les,
e.g., whether a le is deleted.
Note that the isolation engine holds all the information
about modications to the le system, and the operating
system kernel does not know about these changes. There-
fore the isolation engine needs to modify the arguments
and/or the return values of system calls that access les.
In particular, when a system call is invoked in an isolated
process, the system call interceptor sends a notication to
the manager module. The manager module handles le sys-
tem modication operations, while forwarding the rest of
the system calls to the connementengine. If the le opera-
tion refers to objects that have been modied, then the man-
ager modies the path name argument so that it refers to
the modied object located within the modication cache.
These (possibly modied) arguments are returned back to
the system call interceptor. When the system call returns,
the manager module is once again notied, so that it may
modify the results returned by the system call as necessary.
The mapping table maps one absolute le name into an-
other.However,not all the system calls are invokedwith ab-
solute path names. Hence le names must be resolved into
absolutepath names, with symboliclinks expanded,and the
. and .. entries resolved. The CWD Tracking mod-
ule helps this process. It maintains the current working di-
rectory of each process and updates them when a process
makes a system call that results in changes to that direc-
tory. The current working directory of a parent process will
be inherited by its children.
After the untrusted process nishes execution, the isola-
tion engine invokes a GUI (graphical user interface), whichRead Only Modication Operations
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presentsa compactsummaryofthe securityrelevantactions
made by the process. If these changes are accepted by the
user, then they are copied over so that they become visi-
ble to other processes in the system. Criteria for determin-
ing whethersuch copyingcan be done while preservingiso-
lation semantics is described later in the paper. Below, we
describe the key components of Alcatraz in further detail.
2.3. Manager
As mentioned above, the key problem in implementing
the isolation engine is that of modifying le-related system
calls in a manner that provides a consistent view of the sys-
tem state to the isolated process. This becomes a challeng-
ing task when we consider the different kinds of le sys-
tem objects (regular les, directories, symbolic links, etc.)
and the large number of le system related operations (34
out of the 243 system calls in Linux kerner version 2.4.18).
To tackle this complexity, we make the following observa-
tions about the kinds of le system objects that need to be
considered:regularles, directories,symboliclinks, andIn-
odes. (Inodes contain meta data about les, such as per-
mission, ownership etc.) File modication operations may
be different across these le types. For example, regular
les are viewed as a stream of bytes, and can be modi-
ed by seeking to any location (expressed as a byte offset)
within the le, and performing a write system call. Direc-
tories, on the other hand, are viewed as a sequence of direc-
toryentries,whicharerecordscontaininginformationabout
the les within the directory. For symbolic links, the only
modicationis that of le deletion. In this sense, it is noth-
ing more than a directory modication operation. Thus, we
need only consider three kinds of objects on the le sys-
tem: regular les, directories, and Inodes.
Now consider the system call operations on the le sys-
tem. For the isolation operation, we need to consider only
those system calls that are path name related. System calls
that operate on le descriptors (e.g., read, write and
mmap) can be left to the operating system to handle. Path
name based operations can be classied as shown in Fig-
ure 2 based on whether they modify the le system and the
object modied. Since the manner in which read opera-
tions are implemented is determined by the way modica-
tions are implemented, our description below is organized
by the three categories of modication operations.
Regular le modications. Consider a process that opens
a le f for writing. A natural way to isolate the execu-
tion of the process is to create a new copy f0 of f that is
stored within the modication cache. All future accesses to
f,whethertheybemodicationsor reads,will be redirected
to f0. To enable this redirection,an entry associating f with
f0 is inserted into the mapping table. An optimization that
avoids copyingofles is possiblein the commoncase when
a le is truncated to zero length at the open.
Directory modications. The above simple implementa-
tion of copy-on-write does not directly extend to directo-
ries. In particular, there is no way to copy a directory into
the modication cache without copying the les and direc-
tories contained within. The problem can be partially over-
comebycreatinga new,emptydirectoryin the modication
cache, and creating hard links from this directory to every
le in the original directory. However, Linux disallows cre-
ation of hard links to directories, so this approach will not
work when subdirectories are involved.Clearly, the alterna-
tive of copying the entire le system contents rooted at the
current directory would be far too inefcient.
To develop a more efcient approach for copy-on-write,
we observe that unlike a regular les, directories are ac-
cessed in a structured manner using specialized directory
operations such as mkdir and getdents. Thus, our ap-
proachisoneofmodifyingtheseoperationsinamannerthat
achieves copy-on-write semantics without having to per-
formactualcopiesofdirectorycontents.Inparticular,modi-
cationstodirectories,suchas creation/deletionofnewles
or directories, are recorded in the modication cache.
When the contents of such modied directories are read
using the getdents operation, we can modify the returned
directory entries as follows. Any directory entry f that is
mapped into f0 by the mapping table is replaced so as to
contain the information about f0. If the le f has been
deleted by the isolated process, then the entry correspond-
ing to f is deleted from the getdents return value. It is
possible that all the entries returned by getdents may be
deleted in this step. If, as a result of this, no entries are re-
turnedtotheisolatedprocess,it wouldconcludethattheend
of the directory has been reached. (This is how getdentsworks under Linux.) To solve this problem, the manager
rst retrievesall of the directoryentries in the directory,and
applies the above changes to the directory entries. We then
append new directory entries that are recorded in the mod-
ication cache but not present in the rest of the le system.
The result is returned to the isolated process.
Inode modication. Modication can also be made to In-
odes which store le system meta data. Inodes are associ-
ated with les and cannot be copied separately. Therefore,
if the modication is made to a le that has already been
copied to the temporary location (i.e., just created or mod-
ied le), we can redirect this operation to its counterpart
in the temporary location. If the modication is made to
an unchanged regular le, we can again copy the le into
the modication cache and proceed as in the previous case.
However, this approach does not work on directories be-
cause, as mentioned in the preceding section, we cannot
copy a directory.One possibility is to use the isolation layer
to record the changed Inode information of directories and
let all related system calls make use of this information.
However, this solution is not very useful in all cases, as the
kernel does not know about the existence of such informa-
tion. For example, if the untrusted program adds write per-
mission to an existing directory, using this approach, this
change will be stored in the isolation layer, but the kernel
will still not allow it to write into that directory because this
changed permission information is not visible to the kernel.
In our implementation, the isolation layer records an error
message in such situations, and allows continued execution
of the isolated process. This limitation has not posed a sig-
nicant problem in practice, since it is very unusual for un-
trusted code to change permissions on the directories that
were not created by it.
Since the latest Inode information is held within the iso-
lation layer, system calls to access or manipulate meta data,
such as stat, need to be intercepted by the manager and
redirected if necessary. Moreover, since the correct permis-
sion information is not available to the le system, permis-
sion checking needs to be handled by the isolation layer.
To understand the need for this, consider the case when the
isolated process modies a le that it does not own but has
the write permission. The isolation engine will copy the le
into the modication cache before making these changes.
Duringcopyingprocess, the operatingsystem will automat-
ically set the ownership of the copy to that of the owner of
the isolated process. It would be preferable to change the
ownership back to the owner of the original le, but this
will be disallowed by the kernel unless the isolation engine
runs with root privileges. Since it was one of our design
goals to support isolation without requiring superuser priv-
ileges, we cannot change the ownership information on the
le. This means that the OS will interpret the permissions
incorrectly, thus requiring the isolation engine to take over
this task.
2.3.1. Connement Engine The untrusted program may
perform other operations that are unrelated to the le sys-
tem. Some of these operations do not cause difculties in
preservingisolation semantics, e.g., system calls for obtain-
ing timing information, process ownership, host attributes,
etc. Others, such as those involving network communica-
tion or interaction with processes outside its isolation con-
text, will pose a problem. It is the responsibility of the con-
nement engine to deal with all system calls that are unre-
lated to le systems. It determines which system calls can
bepermittedwithoutcompromisingthe isolationsemantics.
The connement engine is built from security policy
specications that specify which system calls can be per-
mitted, and in what context. These policies are specied us-
ing a language called BMSL (Behavior MonitoringSpeci-
cationLanguage)[20, 22].BMSL canexpressdescribecon-
ventional access control policies, history sensitive policies
(e.g.,an applicationcannot access the networkafter reading
sensitive les) and resource usage policies (e.g., an applica-
tion can write no more than k bytes of data). These policies
are compiled using the BMSL compiler to produce the con-
nement engine. A detailed description of BMSL syntax,
semantics, and compilation can be found in [22].
Theconnementenginecurrentlydisallows networksre-
quests such as web access, DNS queries, and X-windows
operations. As outlined earlier, these limitations can be re-
laxed using service-specic proxies. For instance, we can
have a proxy that receives DNS requests from the isolated
process,andforwardsthemtotheDNSserverifit canbeas-
certained that this query will not change the system state.
2.4. System Call Interceptor
Thesystemcall interceptoris implementedin suchaway
that it is easily portable to other Unix variants (that do not
support ptrace for instance). The architecture of our inter-
ceptor is based on the design presented in [10].
The implementation of the interceptor (the tracing pro-
cess) is based on Linux's ptrace system call, which al-
lows one process, called the monitoring process to trace an-
other process, called the monitored process. Tracing capa-
bilities include the ability to intercept system calls made by
the monitored process, and examination or modication of
the virtual memory of the monitored process. When using
ptrace for monitoring and conning untrusted processes,
we face a number of difculties that can compromise secu-
rity. Below, we summarize how our implementation tackles
these difculties.
Rogue processes may cause the interceptorto terminate.
A malicious process may try to terminate the process that
is monitoring it. For instance, it can send a kill signal to
the monitoring process. However, this must again be donethrougha system call,whichwill beinterceptedandaborted
by the montoring process.
Fork/clone race condition. When a monitoredprocess ex-
ecutesa forksystem call,the childprocessis nottracedau-
tomatically. The monitoring process must explicitly request
tracing of the child process by invoking ptrace with the
child PID (process identier) as an argument. However, the
child PID is unavailable until the fork system call returns
to the parent. By then, it is possible that the child process
mayhavestartedrunning,andexecutedsystem calls thatthe
monitoringprocess wouldnot permit. To solve this problem
we adopt a clever trick that was devised in the strace [3]
program. Specically, when the monitoring process inter-
ceptstheparent'sentryinto forksystemcall,itreplacesthe
the instruction in the parent's code at its instruction pointer
(IP) with a loop instruction. Note that the child will inherit
this code, as well as the value of IP. This means that when
control returns to the child, it will execute the loop instruc-
tion, and hence will be stuck in an innite loop. In partic-
ular, it won't be able to make any system calls. When the
fork system call returns to the parent, the monitoring pro-
cess obtains the child PID, and issues a ptrace system call
to attach to the child. It then restores the original instructed
that was stored at the instruction pointer, so that the child
processcan continuewith its normalexecution,but now un-
der the control of the monitoring process.
Even after the above enhancement, there still exists a
possibility of a race condition: if the child process receives
a signal, this will interrupt the loop and cause execution of
its signal handler, which can execute system calls that may
not be permitted by the monitor. To prevent this possibil-
ity, we note that if another process intentionally cooperates
with the child process to free it, then that process must it-
self be an untrusted process under the control of the moni-
toringprocess.Thesystem call usedbythe cooperatingpro-
cess to send a signal can then be intercepted by the monitor
and delayed until it has control of the child process.
Argument race condition. There is a delay between the
time when the arguments of a system call is checked by the
monitoring process and the time when the arguments are
actually read by the kernel. If the arguments are stored in
a memory region shared by several processes or threads, it
is possible for these processes/threads to modify the argu-
ments during that time delay. We address this problem by
moving security-critical arguments to a random location on
the stack [10]. In order for the attack to succeed in spite
of this change, collaborating threads (or processes) need to
scan the entire stack to nd the location where the argument
is stored, and this scan must be completed within the short
interval between the time when arguments are checked by
the monitoring process and the time they are used by the
kernel. If the random number is chosen over a reasonably
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large range, e.g., 107 or 108, then the likelihood of success-
ful attacks becomes very small.
2.5. User Interface
After the isolated process and its children nish execu-
tion, the information maintained in the mapping table is
sent to the user interface (GUI). The GUI sorts/groups le
changes by path names, and then presents them to the user
in a tree like representation as shown in Figure 3. The user
can select the kinds of changes that they wish to see, e.g.,
new les created, les overwritten, etc. For modied les,
users can view the difference between the original and the
new version by simply clicking on the le name.
Optionally, the user can use a shell that runs in the same
isolation context as the untrusted process, but has access to
the original le system through the /alcatraz virtual di-
rectory. Moreover, the children of this shell are permitted
to access X-windows, so that arbitrary helper applications
(e.g., image viewers) can be launched by the user to view
the modied les.
2.5.1. Commit Criteria. After examining the changes
made by the untrusted process, a user can determine
whether these changes can be committed to the sys-
tem. However, it is possible that other processes, running
outside of the isolation context of the untrusted pro-
cess, may have made modications to the le system. If
these changes interfere with the changes made by the un-
trusted process, then commitment of the changes made
by the untrusted process can lead to an inconsistent sys-
tem state. Hence, we adopt an approach in which the com-
mit operation is allowed to go through only if the les
modied by the isolated process were neither read nor writ-
ten by outside processes since the instant the les were rst
accessed by the isolated process.
It may seem that this approach is too conservative and
mayrejectresultsthatcanbeconsistentlycommitted.While
this may be true, we observe that aborts do not cause toomuch difculty in Alcatraz. In particular, the untrusted pro-
gram can be executed again. Since the changes made by
the untrusted program were discarded, rerunning the pro-
gram will likely produce the same results. At this point, the
same interference may not have taken place (assuming that
such interference was a rare coincidence),and hence the re-
sults can be committed.
Our current implementation of commitment contains a
race condition.In particular, interference(by processes out-
side of isolation) may happen during the time les are
copied from the modication cache to the le system. This
race condition can be avoided using le system locks. Un-
fortunately, mandatory locks are not supported by default
on Linux due to the possibility that they may lead to dead-
locks. If this were not the case, then the race condition can
be avoided. In practice, however, we note that the race con-
ditionis notasignicantprobleminthe contextofuntrusted
program execution, as it is unlikely that the les accessed
by such a program would also be accessed by other unre-
lated processes, that too within the short period taken for
le copying.
3. Implementation results
We have implemented Alcatraz on the Linux operating
system [1]. The implementation has been tested on Red Hat
Linux 7.2 and Red Hat Linux 8.0 distributions. The perfor-
mance gures given below were obtained on a PC running
Red Hat Linux 7.2 on a 1.7GHz P4 processor with 1GB
memory.
3.1. Example Applications
Our implementation was tested with three applications:
two freeware program that organize image/audio les, and
the installation of a software package.
Picturepagesis aphotoorganizingprogramdiscussed
in Section 1.1. We tested it with a directory of jpeg photos.
Alcatraz reported the creation of a directory and changes to
the picture les. We further used an image viewer to exam-
ine some of the generated pictures to make sure that they
were properly modied.
The second program that was used is mpls, which takes
a list of mp3 les and creates a playlist sorted by artist, al-
bum, track, or title on the standard output. A directory con-
taining various mp3 les was used as the input. After the
program nished execution, the user-interface presented a
report that summarized that no changes were made to the
le system.
The third program we tested was the installation of
mozilla, a free web browser. The installation program
modied three conguration les of a previous version
of mozilla and installed all les into a new directory.
All these changes were captured by Alcatraz and reported
through the user interface, as shown in Figure 3.
In all these examples, the isolation operation guaranteed
the safety of the user's resources, as well as provided the
convenience of concise summaries on the outputs of these
executions.
3.2. Performance results
We have measured the performanceusing two sets of ap-
plications. The rst set of applications are the above exam-
ples. The second set included common UNIX utilities such
as make gcc, gzip, ghostscript, and tar.
The following testing data was used:
 for make gcc, we compiled the openssh package ver-
sion 3.7p1 under isolation. It contained 69849 lines of
C code.
 for tar, a directory tree containing several mp3 les
were used as the input for the archive operation. The
size of output le was 85MB.
 for gzip, the output of the above tar command was
used as input.
 for ghostscript, a 10-page paper, containing 170K
bytes, was used as the input.
In order to know how each module in Alcatraz contributes
to the overhead, we performed three time measurements of
the sample application. They are the execution time with-
out any system call interception, the execution time with
onlythesystem call interceptor,andtheexecutiontime with
full isolation system, respectively. The normalized execu-
tion time (ratio to the execution time without isolation and
without system call interposition) is shown in Figure 4.
From the performance results, we can see that the isola-
tion mechanism itself (the difference between the overhead
of Interception Only and the overhead of Isolation)
contributes to a modest overhead of less than 20%. How-
ever, the system call interposition mechanism contributes
to a signicant overhead for some programs. This over-
headvarieslinearlywiththefrequencyofsystem calls made
by an application. Compute-intensive applications such as
gzip and picturepages make much fewer system calls
per unit time of execution, while other applications such as
tar make system calls at a much higher rate.
System call interception overhead can be signicantly
reduced (to under 10%) using an in-kernel implementation.
However, if we had based Alcatraz on kernel-based inter-
ception, it would be harderto port, and moreover,cannot be
downloaded,installed or run by users that do not have supe-
ruser privilege. Compared to this drawback, the additional
overhead seems to be quite acceptable for the class of ap-
plications targeted by Alcatraz.
4. Related work
Sandboxing systems. Janus [9] incorporates a /proc le
system based system call interpositiontechniquefor the So-Interception Only
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Figure 4. Normalized Performance Results
laris operating system. A more recent version has been im-
plemented on Linux, and uses a kernel module for interpo-
sition. Chakravyuha [8] is a monitoring system that uses a
kernel interception mechanism to implement a sandboxing
approach. MAPbox [4] is a sandboxing mechanism where
the goal is to make the sandbox more congurable and
usable by providing template classications of behaviors.
Consh[5] providesa similar sandboxingenvironmentwhile
addressing transparent local and remote access to les.
SoftwarePot [12] incorporates a secure software circula-
tion model that connes the behavior of the untrusted pro-
gram. In this case, the software to be run is encapsulated
with a le system. The user must encapsulate the complete
list of the le system resources needed by the program in
order to make it execute successfully. Furthermore, all the
operations to the les are conned to the pot archive.
The scheme still requires apriori policy selection, which (as
pointed out in the introduction) is often difcult.
Systrace [16] is a sandboxing system that noties the
user about all system calls that an application tries to ex-
ecute. It then uses the response from the user to generate a
policy for the application.
The disadvantages of sandboxing approaches, as com-
pared to isolation, was discussed in Section 1.1.
Isolation systems. [15] and [7] use physical isolation to
protectagainstdamagesto the client's machine.The incom-
ing mobile code (java applet) is sent to another set of ma-
chines, called playground (some machines containing no
important data), to execute. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, these two systems only target Java applets (which only
constitutes a small fragment of the large body of untrusted
code on the Internet), require additional resources (such as
new machines), and disallow any access to the user's en-
vironment. In contrast, our approach is language indepen-
dent, and requires no additional physical resources and al-
lows safe access to the user's environment.
Logical isolation provides many benets over physi-
cal isolation. It has been suggested before and analyzed
[14, 11, 19]. Algorithms and protocols for realizing logi-
cal isolation in the context of databases as well as le sys-
tems was presented in [14]. In the le system context, it de-
scribed isolation protocol, merging protocol, and an algo-
rithm for resolving conicts. However, practical issues that
arise in implementing the approach on a modern operating
system were not considered. Our work in this paper com-
plements these works, and developing an application- and
OS-transparentapproachfor practical approachand tool for
realizing logically isolated execution of programs.
Recovery-oriented systems. The Recovery-Oriented
Computing (ROC) project at Berkeley [2] is develop-
ing techniques for fast recovery from failures, focusing
on failures due to operator errors. [6] presents a broad ap-
proach that assists recovery from operator errors in
administering a network server, with the specic exam-
ple of an email server. In spite of the apparent similarities
in the goals of this work and ours, the technical require-
ments are quite different. They target network-oriented ap-
plications whose actions (and their effects) needs to be
visible to other processes and/or hosts. In contrast, our ap-
proach targets le-oriented applications whose actions
should be invisible to the rest of the world.
[23]presentsanapproachforsafeexecutionofmalicious
applications on Microsoft Windows by intercepting oper-
ations made by the malicious code. Their approach is to
create backup copies of les before they are modied by
the malicious application. A drawback of this approach, as
compared to ours, is that the modications are visible to
other benign processes in the system. If a benign process
modies the system based on the les modied by the ma-
licious process, then there may be no way to undo these ef-
fects. In contrast, our approach ensures that the actions of
the isolated process(es) do not corrupt the system.File system approaches. The Elephant le system [17] re-
tains all the importantversionsof a le, and has an interface
for users to select a specic version. RFS (Repairable File
Service) [24] is specically designed to facilitate repair of
a compromised network le server by maintaining previous
versions of les. These approaches generally have a signif-
icant storage overhead, since storing versions can consume
signicant additional space. In contrast, our approach does
not impose high storage overheads. More importantly, our
isolation approach provides a simple, automatic approach
to undo the effects of a malicious process. In contrast, the
undo step typically requires manual assistance in the case
of versioning approaches. Moreover, there is no easy way
to undo the effects of a malicious process without risking
loss of data, which may occur due to the fact that some ac-
tions of benign processes are rolled back as well.
3D le system [13] provides a convenient way for soft-
ware developers to work with different versions of a soft-
ware package. It also introduces a technique called trans-
parent viewpathing which is based on translating le names
used by a process. It gives a union view of several direc-
tory structures thus allowing the application transparently
access one directory through another's path. As it is not de-
signed to deal with untrusted applications, it needs the co-
operation from the application for this mechanism to work,
while our approachprovidesa mandatoryisolation layer for
the untrusted program.
5. Summary
In this paper, we presented an approach that supports
safe execution of untrusted programs. Our approach uses
the idea of logical program isolation, where actions of the
code are invisible to the rest of the system until they are
committed by a user. Before committing, the user can in-
spect the system state to determine if the actions of the pro-
gramcompromisedtheintegrityofthesystem.Wehavepre-
sented a tool called Alcatraz [1] that incorporates this ap-
proach.Our approachprovidessecurityfortheend-userand
enjoys many benets such as application transparency and
user friendliness. We have discussed the design and imple-
mentation and presented the results of our implementation.
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